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STATE INCENTIVES, PLEA BARGAINING
REGULATION, AND THE FAILED
MARKET FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE
LISA KERN GRIFFIN*
I
INTRODUCTION
The plea bargaining process receives minimal oversight from the courts and
contains scarce regulatory protections. In the past few years, however, the
Supreme Court has issued three decisions that incrementally expand the
requirement of adequate assistance of counsel for criminal defendants. The
Court has held that the failure to advise a defendant entering a guilty plea of the
collateral immigration consequences of conviction,1 exceedingly poor advice
about rejecting a plea offer,2 and counsel’s failure to even convey the terms of a
plea deal all constitute breaches of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
representation.3 Although these decisions do not portend significant
constitutional regulation of prosecutorial tactics or changes to the terms of plea
agreements themselves, they have unexplored potential to affect the failing
system of public defense.
The Court’s opinions lie at the intersection of two “markets” in the criminal
justice system: plea bargaining and the provision of indigent defense. The system
of plea bargaining relies on free-market conceptions of private ordering, and the
process reflects minimal concern with coercion or fairness. Prosecutors are
permitted to threaten any legal sanction to induce a plea, and broad potential
charges combined with disproportionate sentencing statutes generate substantial
leverage. The courts’ longstanding “deregulatory” approach indicates
indifference to unequal resources and asymmetrical information. The advice of
counsel in theory guarantees a voluntary plea despite the hard bargaining
permitted in the process.
The vast majority of defendants engaged in plea bargaining—several million
each year—rely on a publicly funded system for the provision of counsel.4 Thus
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1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
2. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
3. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
4. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, STATE PUBLIC
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the state not only initiates the criminal process and funds the prosecution but also
organizes the market for indigent defense. Staggering caseloads and minimal
standards have produced an acute crisis in that system. To date, there has also
been limited judicial oversight of the adequacy of defense counsel. Though there
is a constitutional entitlement to representation, the Court has resisted any
particular guidelines for attorney performance.
But by imposing even modest new requirements in the recent trio of cases,
the Court has created a potential conflict between the efficiency of the plea
bargaining market and the failing market for the representation of indigent
defendants in the states. If certain information must be provided to clients in
order for plea agreements to stand, then defense lawyers need enough resources
to spend a few minutes more with those clients. Moving that lever—with the
external force of court-imposed baselines for plea advice—has the potential to
alter the state’s incentives and propel the market toward a new equilibrium. In
other words, if the constitutional floor even slightly expands the amount of time
counsel must spend with defendants to ensure that pleas will be upheld, then the
resources allocated to indigent defense might increase as well.
II
MARKET-BASED CONCEPTIONS OF PLEA BARGAINING
Negotiated settlements of criminal prosecutions resolve approximately
ninety-seven percent of all cases in the federal system and ninety-four percent of
criminal cases in state courts.5 The Court has recently recognized that it no longer
makes sense to conceptualize plea bargaining as a process that occurs in the
shadow of a potential trial. Plea bargaining simply “is the criminal justice
system.”6
Plea bargaining is also almost entirely unregulated. A completed plea
agreement has the same force and effect as a jury verdict following a trial,7 yet
the judgment issues largely without any public adjudication or concern with
public law conceptions of fairness. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure set
forth some procedural requirements for the entry of guilty pleas,8 such as
informing a defendant of her trial rights and the statutory maximum penalties she

DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007 3 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf [https://perma.
cc/R5WT-2RWP].
5. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. The state misdemeanor plea rate is slightly higher. See Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2015) (noting that the “ninetyfive percent plea rate generates millions of convictions without the kinds of procedural or evidentiary
checks on which we typically rely to ensure accuracy and fairness”); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon
Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2013) (describing the petty offense system as a “speedy,
low-scrutiny process in which outcomes are largely predetermined”).
6. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
7. See, e.g., Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927) (stating that completed pleas, like
jury verdicts, are “conclusive”).
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
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may face. When it comes to the substance of the bargains, however, the courts
have exercised negligible oversight.
Given caseload pressures, courts treat plea bargains as an efficient way to
resolve cases and achieve satisfactory outcomes for both sides. Although there is
ample debate about whether plea bargaining is indeed efficient, the current state
of the process itself is widely regarded as analogous to private ordering. Courts
and commentators alike view plea agreements through the lens of market-based
rationales and norms.9 The private law model overrides “competing public
interests, such as fairness, accuracy, proportionality or consistency.”10 In theory,
this is because the parties negotiate freely. The government has an interest in
securing a conviction and obtaining a waiver of the default trial right. Certainty
of outcome, conservation of executive and judicial resources, and potential
cooperation from defendants all factor into the value of a defendant’s plea.11 And
plea agreements appear mutually beneficial because they are “desired by
defendants”12 as the only mechanism for significant leniency in sentencing. That
each side possesses some assets to exchange going into the negotiation process,
however, does not ensure the efficiencies of private ordering. In practice, both
the high rate and the harsh terms of plea bargaining arise from an institutional
design that strongly favors prosecutorial discretion.13
The substantive criminal law offers an expansive menu of charging options
and discretionary sentencing factors. Prosecutorial discretion is both horizontal,
allowing for multiple counts arising from the same conduct, and vertical, allowing
for charges of more or less serious offenses and the addition of sentencing
enhancements. Negotiations might occur over offenses, sentencing
recommendations, or both. It is hard to overstate the state’s leverage given its
control over both the crime charged and the punishment sought.14 The whole
process leaves doubt about “whether bargaining involves a discount for pleading
guilty or a penalty for refusing to do so.”15
9. See DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY AND
LAISSEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 99 (2016) (explaining that the structure of plea
bargaining responds to the “justice system’s demand for it” and requires “minimal constraints on party
interactions that characterize free markets and private contracts”).
10. Id. at 101 (citing Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV.
407 (2008)).
11. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82
TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1246, 1288 n.223 (2008).
12. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002).
13. See Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV.
713, 713 (1988) (emphasizing the role of prosecutorial discretion in government control over pricing in
the plea bargaining market). See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003) (explaining how plea bargaining came to dominate
criminal process because it enabled prosecutors and courts to control the allocation of resources).
14. See Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining and Price Theory, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 920, 952 (2016)
(“[D]iscretion to charge coupled with constantly inflating guideline-determined sentences provides
almost unchecked prosecutorial power over sentencing outcomes.”).
15. BROWN, supra note 9, at 93; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)
(acknowledging that defendants are choosing between exercising trial rights and risking more severe
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Despite the imbalance of power, courts persist in treating plea bargaining
more or less as a matter of private contract like “any other bargained-for
exchange.”16 They perceive autonomous parties engaged in negotiation and
conclude that efficiencies will be served by minimal state regulation.17
Defendants have the constitutional right to plead not guilty and proceed to trial.
Prosecutors have the institutional power to select the most serious charges and
seek the maximum sentence. Parties can trade off those rights when they value
each other’s entitlements more than their own.
In one canonical defense of plea bargaining as a well-functioning market,
Frank Easterbrook describes the market as a “bilateral monopoly.”18 Defendants,
in his view, “shop” when they choose an offense and a jurisdiction.19 The
defendant controls this move ex ante but cannot later switch prosecutors, and thus
the government exerts leverage ex post. Prosecutorial discretion, the negotiation
process, and sentencing ranges interact to set the price “in the same way as
bargaining in the market for goods and services.”20 Defendants sell procedural
rights that have little value to them at trial but considerable value in trade. The
parties save the costs of trial, defendants receive lower sentences, and the
government can direct funds to other cases.
The system thus achieves maximum deterrence with its scarce resources.
According to Easterbrook’s reasoning, mandatory penalties or significant thirdparty oversight of negotiations would inhibit freedom to contract and would
reduce these efficiencies.21 Consider the impact of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, which took effect in 1987.22 To some extent, the defined sentencing
ranges set by the Guidelines operate as a regulatory check on the discount the
government can offer to a pleading defendant. But prosecutorial discretion
merely shifted to charge bargaining, which gave prosecutors renewed power to
set the difference between the sentences.23 “[D]efendants,” Easterbook argues,
“cannot be made better off by limiting their options.”24 Although he
punishment).
16. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984).
17. See id.
18. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 289, 311
(1983); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992).
19. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, supra note 18 at 291; cf. Jeffrey Standen,
Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1473–76 (1993) (offering a
different description of the market as a “monopsony” with prosecutors as the sole purchasers empowered
to offer pleas at subcompetitive prices).
20. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, supra note 18, at 308.
21. Id. at 298.
22. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION 1987, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL.
23. See FISHER, supra note 13, at 212 (noting that “narrowly fixed penalty provisions” lead to
prosecutors constraining the judicial sentencing options “by manipulating the slate of charges”); Ronald
F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79,
129 (2005) (“Changes in federal sentencing practices during the 1980s and 1990s increased the certainty
and size of the penalty for going to trial, and mightily influenced the guilty plea and acquittal rates during
those times.”).
24. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining is a Shadow Market, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 551, 555 (2013).
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acknowledges the coercive potential of the trial penalty, possible conflicts of
interest for defense counsel receiving fixed fees or prosecutors interested in
marquee trials, and unequal treatment of defendants, Easterbrook regards all of
these objections as trivial when weighed against the deterrence gains of the
system.25
Other scholars object to the market-based justifications for the plea
bargaining process and urge that it be treated as a political system that “lacks the
distinctive equilibrium mechanisms that characterize ordinary commercial
markets.”26 According to Stephen Schulhofer, for example, there are agency costs
for both the prosecutor acting for the public and the defense lawyer acting for the
defendant.27 The best way to address those costs might be regulation to limit
discretion, with features such as fixed discounts in place of case-by-case
bargaining.28 Although the market may be efficient in terms of the volume of
completed plea bargains, the lack of regulation also produces unfairness to
individual defendants, inaccurate results, coerced dispositions, and compromises
based on inadequate information.29 Even in the case of factually guilty
defendants, sentences differ for those similarly situated because they depend on
the circumstances of the negotiations rather than the details of the crime.
Critics of the market-based conception have also noted that “the rational
actor paradigm in plea bargaining may not capture the reality of the negotiation
between prosecutor and defense counsel.”30 One would expect pricing to emerge
from inputs of the probability of conviction, the anticipated sentence upon
conviction, and the resources saved by avoiding trial. The price of a plea would
then be the size of the discount necessary to induce a defendant to accept a
bargain. But rational actors do not prefer pleas to trials in every instance—
defendants might disagree about the worth of the case or desire a trial for some
reason other than utility maximization. Asymmetrical information, the effects of
framing, defendants’ risk preferences, time discounting, and the institutional
context arguably have more explanatory power than efficient market
bargaining.31
In addition, the background touchstone of the likely outcome at trial is more
theoretical than real.32 Defendants cannot calculate the chances of acquittal with
25. Easterbook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, supra note 18, at 310 (remarking that
“some lawyers are just better than others”).
26. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
43, 44 (1988).
27. Id. at 49.
28. Id. at 52.
29. See id. at 81–82; see also Anne R. Traum, Fairly Pricing Guilty Pleas, 58 HOW. L.J. 437, 443
(2015) (reasoning that plea bargaining contracts are distributively unfair because there is insufficient
consideration of equity in pricing, equality in treatment, or special allowance for the disadvantaged).
30. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining,
91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 165 (2007).
31. Id. at 165, 169–70.
32. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1949; see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2464 (2004).
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any precision because pre-plea discovery is limited when it comes to both
exculpatory and inculpatory information.33 Nor do defendants have sufficient
data about likely penalties or the types of bargains typically available for the
charged crime. And they frequently must decide in a matter of minutes whether
to accept a plea offer.34 Defendants cannot determine the value of a plea because
they can neither estimate the trial outcome nor discount that result by its
likelihood. Plea bargaining appears on the surface to function like other markets
with pricing mechanisms. But as Russell Covey has recently pointed out, the
“primary factors in determining plea prices—expected sentences, probability of
conviction, and cost of litigation—all are, and have been, subject to manipulation
by the government.”35
III
LAISSEZ FAIRE REGULATION OF PLEA BARGAINING
The law of plea bargaining takes almost no account of these objections and
relies heavily on rational choice theory. The regulation of plea agreements
“through the common-law process is fundamentally no different from the way
courts treat other contracts” between civil parties.36 The Court has adopted
wholesale the idea that plea bargaining proceeds from a “mutuality of
advantage.”37 The government saves resources, and defendants receive reduced
sentences. The courts’ “market-based rationality is at times almost comically
explicit.”38 In United States v. Mezzanatto, for example, the Supreme Court flatly
stated that “[a] defendant can ‘maximize’ what he has to ‘sell’ only if he is
permitted to offer what the prosecutor is most interested in buying.”39 Or, as
Easterbrook writes, “judges must be careful not to override real people’s actual
views about their actual interests in favor of what judges think those views and
interests ought to be.”40
In accordance with this conception, the plea system is “built around
prosecutorial discretion, defense autonomy to trade away procedural

33. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002); see also Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense
Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty Years After Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
407 (2014); Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (2015); Jenia I. Turner & Allison
D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 285 (2016).
34. See Covey, supra note 14, at 946.
35. Id. at 921, 949 (explaining that the state manipulates the “supply of penal leniency” by increasing
maximum sentence exposure and the number of chargeable offenses).
36. Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 551.
37. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752–53 (1970); see also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212,
222 (1978).
38. Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1225,
1272 (2016).
39. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1995); see also id. (concluding that courts should
not impose “any arbitrary limits on [the parties’] bargaining chips” in order to avoid “stifl[ing] the market
for plea bargains”).
40. Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 551.
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entitlements, and a largely passive judiciary.”41 The passivity of courts in the face
of market justifications leads to disregard for fairness, indifference to accuracy,
only superficial assessments of potential coercion, and assumptions about the
competency of counsel representing defendants in the plea bargaining process.
First, courts assess fairness to the defendant in the sense of due process as
more or less coextensive with a conception of fairness in private markets. The
parties to plea bargains retain similar “autonomy from state regulation to
compete against or negotiate with others and enter into contracts, with few legal
standards about fair bargaining practices, conditions, and contract terms.”42 Plea
negotiations tend to be informal and take place in private. The plea bargain itself
is announced in open court and becomes a matter of record only after agreement
is reached. In that process, the standards for prosecutorial conduct are no higher
than those for other private actors competing in a free market. The Court has
deemed the prosecutor’s interest in persuading the defendant to forgo trial rights
“constitutionally legitimate.”43 Nor does the good or bad faith of the prosecutor’s
negotiation tactics make any difference, as long as there is no evidence of
invidious discrimination such as racial bias.44 Thus, for negotiated pleas, as for
private contracts, “the law permits terms and outcomes widely condemned as
unfair.”45
Second, courts do not account for the factual accuracy of the outcomes that
plea bargaining produces. Actually innocent defendants often reach the rational
decision to plead guilty.46 Indeed, innocent defendants may be more likely to
plead under imperfect information and may be more risk averse than guilty
defendants.47 Recent studies of DNA exonerations reveal substantial numbers of
wrongful convictions obtained by guilty pleas.48 Plea bargaining masks factual
questions about whether a defendant committed the crime and “is perhaps the
most prominent example of the criminal justice system operating collateral to a
quest for truth.”49 The ultimate goal is a completed agreement, often at the

41. BROWN, supra note 9, at 117.
42. Brown, supra note 38, at 1273.
43. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (accepting “the simple reality that the
prosecutor’s interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not
guilty”); see also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–25 (1979) (approving prosecutorial
discretion to make charging decisions with varying punishments).
44. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 118.
45. BROWN, supra note 9, at 118.
46. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1117–18 (2008); see also
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the reality of
“prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by
pleading guilty to a lesser offense”).
47. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1949; see also Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions
and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 143, 171 (“The reasons people plead guilty after plea bargaining
are numerous, and actual guilt has little bearing on the calculus.”).
48. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 150–53 (2011).
49. Alison Orr Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1611 (2011).

GRIFFIN (DO NOT DELETE)

90

3/14/2017 2:26 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 80: 83

expense of reliable conclusions about the nature or severity of the crime.50 Courts
thus permit defendants to plead guilty even when they persist in professing their
legal innocence.51 In addition, misdemeanor defendants with strong defense
claims frequently enter guilty pleas because they are being held without bail or
cannot afford bail. The rational choice is a plea to time served despite convincing
evidence of innocence because that resolution is clearly preferable to remaining
incarcerated for a longer period pending trial.52
Although fairness and accuracy do not play a significant role in the regulation
of plea bargaining, courts do reference two constitutional limitations when
defendants enter pleas: a Fifth Amendment concern with potential coercion and
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Constitution itself makes no mention
of plea bargaining, but limited constitutional oversight of the process dates to the
1971 decision in Santobello v. New York.53 There, the Court recognized that plea
bargaining was “essential” to an efficient system of criminal justice but also
subject to some “safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the
circumstances.”54 Specifically, the Court held that prosecutors are bound by the
promises they make in plea hearings.55
The only bargaining tactics constrained by due process, however, are illegal
fraud and outright coercion.56 Prosecutors may constitutionally threaten any
punishment that the law allows.57 So long as the range of potential charges and
sentences has legal justification, manipulating offense and punishment to induce
a plea is considered an offer rather than a threat.58 Accordingly, although
defendants no doubt face tough choices, the Court still regards them as free
ones.59 If a plea appears “knowing and voluntary,” and the parties articulate some
“factual basis” for the agreement,60 almost anything goes in the negotiation
process.61
50. See generally William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004) (describing the marked difference between civil and criminal settlement
markets).
51. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970).
52. Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, supra note 5, at 1053 (“Because poor defendants often cannot
make bail, they may have to sacrifice work or child care in order to contest their cases, and therefore
plead guilty in large numbers.”); see also John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated:
Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (2014).
53. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
54. Id. at 261, 262; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 372 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“The plea-bargaining process . . . is essential to the functioning of the criminal-justice system.”).
55. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such
promise must be fulfilled.”).
56. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970) (prohibiting only “actual or threatened
physical harm” or “mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant”).
57. See id. at 751.
58. See, e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 122–43 (1987).
59. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364.
60. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
61. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
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IV
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS
Defense lawyers play a key role in justifying limited judicial scrutiny under
this free-market approach. Commitment to the idea of plea bargaining as an
efficient negotiation has important implications when it comes to a second
market at work: publicly funded counsel. A defendant must be formally
“knowing” with respect to the terms of the bargain, the nature of the charges, the
rights being waived, and the potential sentence to be imposed. But a represented
defendant makes an “intelligent” plea notwithstanding actual ignorance “of the
evidence admissible at trial or the likelihood that trial will result in conviction.”62
Courts assume that having counsel present provides the requisite notice. That
further supposes that the defense lawyer in question is a sophisticated player with
a good sense for market prices and customary practices.63
A. Market-Justifying Advice Of Counsel
The Court’s conception of “mutuality of advantage” rests heavily on the
presence of competent counsel advising the client about whether to enter into a
bargain.64 Although the pleading defendant is not entitled to “fair process” per
se,65 competent representation functions as a sort of consumer protection in the
context of hard bargaining. Almost every time the Court has declined to impose
regulation in the plea bargaining context, it has referenced the fact that “courts
will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made
by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel.”66 So assisted by a
defense lawyer, defendants are “presumptively capable of intelligent choice in
response to prosecutorial persuasion.”67
The defense counsel to which the Court refers will be a publicly funded lawyer
in more than eighty percent of criminal cases.68 The plea bargaining market thus
interacts with the market for indigent criminal defense. And any regulation of

62. Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 599 (2013);
see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (2010) (stating that a defendant cannot withdraw a plea
because “his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the likely penalties attached to
alternative courses of action”).
63. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179,
1180 (1975) (noting the Court’s “optimistic view of the defense attorney’s role” in plea negotiations).
64. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 754–55; see also id. at 748 n.6 (“Since an intelligent assessment of the
relative advantages of pleading guilty is frequently impossible without the assistance of an attorney, this
Court has scrutinized with special care pleas of guilty entered by defendants without the assistance of
counsel . . . .”); see also Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261 (“The accused pleading guilty must be counseled.”);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 784 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“As long as counsel is present
when the defendant pleads, the Court is apparently willing to assume that the government may inject
virtually any influence into the process of deciding on the plea.”).
65. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 225 (1978).
66. Brady, 397 U.S. at 758 (emphasis added).
67. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
68. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SELECTED FINDINGS, INDIGENT
DEFENSE 1 (1992), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLV6-XS2H].
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the standards or conditions for plea bargaining has the potential to affect the
failing system of public defense as well.
B. The System Of Publicly Funded Defense
The provision of counsel to indigent criminal defendants is grounded in the
“noble ideal” and soaring rhetoric of the Supreme Court’s 1963 Gideon
decision.69 Clarence Earl Gideon was arrested and charged with breaking into a
Florida pool hall. At the time, Florida only provided court-appointed counsel in
capital cases. Gideon’s request for an attorney was denied, and he represented
himself at trial. After he was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison,
he filed a now-famous petition detailing his plight.70 Justice Black’s opinion for
the Court cites the “obvious truth” that a fair trial cannot be guaranteed without
the assistance of counsel.71 Every defendant does not stand equal before the law,
he wrote, “if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him.”72
Gideon has a unique status among the Warren Court pronouncements on
criminal procedure. It may be the one decision that enjoys near-universal
affection and approval. Even at the time, the attorneys general of half of the
states signed a brief supporting the petitioner.73 Yet despite wide regard for the
principle as constitutionally necessary and institutionally valuable, “the
overwhelming weight of informed opinion[] is that Gideon has not succeeded in
providing typical indigent defendants with a competent and vigorous defense.”74
That failure is the result of inadequate funding for defense counsel.75
The recent fiftieth anniversary of the Gideon decision prompted substantial
analysis of the state of indigent defense,76 and the inescapable conclusion was that
“public defender offices and other indigent defense providers are underfunded
and understaffed.”77 Insufficient resources, overwhelming caseloads, and
inadequate oversight render the entire system a “national disgrace.”78 Gideon
69. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
70. See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964).
71. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
72. LEWIS, supra note 70, at 189.
73. See Bruce A. Green, Gideon’s Amici: Why Do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights of the
Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336, 2340 (2013).
74. Donald A. Dripps, Up From Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 114 (2012).
75. See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 64, 95 (1999).
76. See, e.g., Symposium, The Failures of Gideon and New Paths Forward, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
307 (2015).
77. Mark Walsh, Fifty Years After Gideon, Lawyers Still Struggle to Provide Counsel to the Indigent,
A.B.A. J., (Mar. 1, 2013, 11:10 AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/fifty_years
_after_gideon_lawyers_still_struggle_to_provide_counsel [https://perma.cc/V9EF-7AZR] (quoting a
speech by United States Attorney General Eric Holder).
78. Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 894
(2009); see also Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 (2006) (“By every measure in every report analyzing the U.S.
criminal justice system, the defense function for poor people is drastically underfinanced.”); Richard
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recognized that “lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”79 But
requiring counsel also imposed an unfunded mandate. And financial pressures
on the states have been “the single greatest obstacle to delivering ‘competent’
and ‘diligent’ defense representation.”80
Approximately ninety percent of all criminal prosecutions take place in
states, counties, and municipalities.81 As in the federal system, the government
funds both the prosecution side and most of the defense side of the criminal
justice process. In order to comply with the constitutional mandate to provide
indigent defense, states have adopted different models, including salaried
attorneys in public defender programs, contracts with private attorneys, and
panel attorneys who receive case-by-case compensation from the court. Some
public defense systems are statewide organizations, but many are divided into
counties or even smaller jurisdictions. In over a third of the states, the provision
of services is decentralized, with county-level funding and county-based
management of the compensation of attorneys and the delivery of services.82 The
result is often that urban counties are overwhelmed by the volume of cases and
the need for indigent defense. Those counties must then rely heavily on flat-fee
systems or contract attorneys with fee caps, both of which incentivize hasty pleas.
Regardless of the particular structure for funding and services, every state is
currently facing an acute shortage of funds for indigent defense.83 Moreover, state
budget shortfalls are expected to increase, at least in the near term, because of
health care costs, underfunded pension plans, infrastructure needs, declining
revenues, and federal budget cuts.84 Far too many jurisdictions have turned to
criminal defendants themselves to pay fees that fund the system of public defense.
The strained public defender program in New Orleans, for example, receives its
funding from fines for traffic infractions.85 In almost half the states, criminal
Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 627, 657 (1986).
79. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
80. See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED:
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7 (2009).
81. See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v.
Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2153 (2013).
82. See INDIGENT DEF. STUDY COMM’N, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2000), http://www.ncids.org/home/ids%20study%20commission%20report.pdf.
83. Bright & Sanneh, supra note 81, at 2153. In contrast, public defense in the federal criminal justice
system—largely because of the requirements of the 1964 Criminal Justice Act—functions in a way widely
regarded as effective. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67
VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1127 (2014).
84. See STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, FULL REPORT 2–4, 6, 50 (July 17, 2012).
85. See Tina Peng, I’m a Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me to Do a Good Job Representing My
Clients, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-public-defendersystem-isnt-just-broken—its-unconstitutional/2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b-11e5-981292d5948a40f8_story
.html?utm_term=.1e325a67db0d [https://perma.cc/58RC-36SU] (noting that Louisiana is “the only state
in America that tries to fund most public defense services with fees associated with traffic tickets, parish
by parish”); see also Derwyn Bunton, Public Defense’s Role in Fighting Injustice, 22 VERDICT 2, 4 (2016)
(describing indigent defense in Louisiana as “a system where public defender budgets depend on traffic
fines and other fees charged to their poor clients”).
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defendants are required to pay application fees for appointed counsel regardless
of indigency.
Under these pressures, state public defense systems fail to attract and
adequately compensate experienced lawyers.86 Hourly rates for public defenders
and panel attorneys can run as low as $40 per hour87 and in some cases have
averaged out to $4 per hour.88 Many jurisdictions impose per-case caps regardless
of the seriousness or complexity of the case. For example, a defense attorney
might earn $600–$1200 for handling an entire felony trial.89 Only rarely do public
defense budgets include funds for the experts and investigators necessary to
challenge the government’s case.90 And at every level of experience, public
defenders earn less than their counterparts on the prosecution side.91
Public defender caseloads also exceed maximum guidelines by more than
150% in many jurisdictions.92 The American Bar Association recommends that
attorneys serving as public defenders take on no more than 150 felonies or 400
misdemeanors total each year.93 In Dade County, Florida, some appointed
lawyers have represented as many as 700 felony defendants or 2,225
misdemeanor defendants in a single year.94 One public defense office in New
Orleans, Louisiana, handles the equivalent of 19,000 misdemeanor cases per
attorney every year, which averages out to about seven available minutes of
attorney time for each disposition.95 For serious felonies proceeding to trial,
public defenders in Missouri spend an average of just nine hours preparing their
cases even though a 2013 study concluded that at least forty-seven hours were
needed per each similar case.96
Recall that the free-market logic of plea bargaining depends on a system in
which rational choices are made with sufficient information. The “meet ‘em and
plead ‘em” model of representation common in jurisdictions across the United
States does not fulfill that condition. Many public defenders are juggling more
than one hundred active cases at any given time. They cannot interview clients,

86. See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 80, at 52–70.
87. Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L. REV. 907, 912–13 (2010).
88. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1853 (1994).
89. Brown, supra note 87, at 912–13.
90. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN
PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 10–11 (2004).
91. See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice
Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 230 (2004).
92. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 90, at 18; Wright, supra note 91, at 230.
93. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A
PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 n.19 (2002).
94. KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE’S JUSTICE
91–94 (2013); JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 80, at 68.
95. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW., MINOR CRIMES,
MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 21 (2009).
96. Derwyn Bunton, When the Public Defender Says, “I Can’t Help,” N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/opinion/when-the-public-defender-says-i-cant-help.html?_r=.
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investigate the facts of the case, or file appropriate motions, let alone effectively
negotiate plea bargains. In addition, face-to-face meetings with clients often
require travel to distant detention facilities. Hurried conversations in the
courtroom itself, or perhaps a hallway or holding cell, are the best that most
public defenders can do.97
As a result, defendants who have waited weeks or months for representation
may then have a five-minute meeting with a defense lawyer before entering a
guilty plea and facing substantial penalties.98 In one Mississippi county, almost
half of the indigent defense cases are resolved by guilty plea on the same day that
the public defender first meets the client.99 Seventy percent of the clients
represented by a California public defender office plead guilty at their first court
appearance, in some cases after less than a minute of explanation about the deal
being offered.100 In market terms, clients achieve no sense of the sales value of
their trial rights from these brief encounters. They have insufficient information
to make the rational choice on which market justifications for plea bargaining
depend.
Several jurisdictions have recently confronted this shortfall and barred public
defenders already staggering under their caseloads from taking any additional
cases. A Louisiana judge began issuing this order after learning that some defense
lawyers were handling up to 180 felonies at a time, and the New Orleans public
defender program has stopped taking new cases altogether.101 Public defenders
represent eighty-five percent of all criminal defendants in the jurisdiction, and
the postponement of cases for which counsel is not available has raised a
significant roadblock in the criminal justice system.102
C. Minimally Adequate Provision Of Counsel
Resource and caseload burdens provide only a partial explanation for the
failure of indigent defense. They persist because the constitutional adequacy of
counsel is measured by a shockingly low standard.103 Competent assistance within
the meaning of the Sixth Amendment has long been required not only at trial but
also in the context of plea bargaining.104 In order to demonstrate that the
97. See Peng, supra note 85.
98. Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV.
1769, 1776 (2016).
99. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 90, at 16.
100. Bright & Sanneh, supra note 81, at 2165.
101. Bunton, supra note 96; see also id. (“Louisiana spends nearly $3.5 billion a year to investigate,
arrest, prosecute, adjudicate and incarcerate its citizens. Less than 2 percent of that is spent on legal
representation for the poor.”).
102. See Peng, supra note 85.
103. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 968 (2004) (“[G]rossly
incompetent lawyers whom none of us would trust with traffic offenses are being entrusted with the lives
and liberty of indigent defendants.”). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE
L.J. 2676 (2013) (attributing the failures of the system of public defense in part to the Strickland
standard).
104. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
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provision of counsel falls below the constitutional bar, however, defendants must
satisfy the Strickland v. Washington test. They must demonstrate both that
counsel’s performance failed to comply with prevailing professional norms and
also that the deficient performance “materially” affected the outcome of the
case.105
Under Strickland, there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”106 Prevailing
professional standards change over time, and the practice norms of an
underfunded system have actually begun to inform what constitutes minimally
effective counsel. As Justice Marshall asked in his Strickland dissent: “Is a
‘reasonably competent attorney’ a reasonably competent adequately paid
retained lawyer or a reasonably competent appointed attorney?”107 Even where
counsel’s errors at trial likely cost a defendant an acquittal,108 a reviewing court
can apply post hoc rationalizations and conclude that the “overall representation
[was] not bad enough to rebut the presumption of reasonableness.”109
The notorious toothlessness of the Strickland standard—under which
napping,110 intoxicated, slothful,111 and even mentally impaired lawyers112 have
been found constitutionally sufficient—arises from the Court’s reluctance to
construct any checklists or recognize any concrete requirements for attorney
performance. Instead, Strickland instructs reviewing courts to accord “a heavy
measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”113

But see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (holding legal advice about a plea competent despite
defendant being incorrectly told that he was eligible for the death penalty).
105. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
106. Id. at 689; see also id. at 688–89 (“No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.”).
107. Id. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. See Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a habitually intoxicated lawyer—
notorious for drinking during the time period of the trial but not actually in court—was not
constitutionally ineffective); see also Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 515, 542–43 (2009) (concluding that the Strickland standard shields “a wide array of stunningly
incompetent and unprofessional representation”). But cf. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (suggesting that counsel’s
error in failing “to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence” could prejudice defendant
by precipitating a guilty plea); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 (1995) (“[T]he Constitution cannot
tolerate trials in which counsel, though present in name, is unable to assist the defendant to obtain a fair
decision on the merits.”).
109. George C. Thomas III, History’s Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 553;
see also Smith, supra note 108, at 520–21 (explaining that claims of constitutional ineffectiveness will fail
wherever there is “any conceivable basis for rationalizing the attorney’s actions”).
110. See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2011).
111. See Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786–87 (1999) (citing examples of
borderline incompetence).
112. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 455–63 (1996).
113. 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1994).
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V
NEWLY IMPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL BASELINES
Three recent plea bargaining cases have adjusted this calculus. The Court has
identified at least small categories of constitutionally inadequate assistance that
have the potential to set some minimum requirements. Although defendants
have no constitutional right to be offered plea deals, they do have a constitutional
right to competent assistance in making the decision whether to accept one.114
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court held that a defense attorney who fails to
inform a non-citizen client of the prospect of deportation following a guilty plea
renders counsel below an objective standard of reasonableness.115 The case
involved a permanent resident from Honduras whose attorney advised him that
he did not have to worry about his immigration status because he had “been in
the country so long.”116 Padilla had spent forty years in the United States, had
children who were United States citizens, and served in the United States
military.117 Because he was convicted of drug trafficking, which is an aggravated
felony, Padilla was subject to automatic deportation.118 The Court concluded that
a defendant who accepts a plea pursuant to such faulty advice about collateral
consequences has been deprived of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a
“critical phase” of criminal proceedings.119
Collateral consequences are not limited to deportation. They include
“involuntary civil commitment, sex-offender registration, and loss of the right to
vote, to obtain professional licenses, and to receive public housing and
benefits.”120 Many defendants will care more about these consequences than
about the criminal convictions themselves. Accordingly, Padilla represents a
potentially important refinement of Strickland that could impact the adequacy of
counsel even beyond incorrect advice about immigration law.121
The 2012 Lafler and Frye decisions similarly reassess the adequacy of counsel,
but with regard to defendants’ decisions to reject plea bargains. The new set of
considerations that the cases introduce could also incrementally lower the
Strickland barrier.122 Both cases further establish that plea bargaining is a critical
114. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012).
115. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
116. Id. at 359.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (holding
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at all “critical stages” of criminal prosecution).
120. Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and
Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2009). See generally
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGELE, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013).
121. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374 (defense counsel must inform defendants of the risk of immigration
consequences because “longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a
consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in
this country demand no less”).
122. Note that there may be more objective metrics of the impact of bad advice during plea
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stage of the criminal justice process and in fact the defining stage for almost all
criminal defendants.123 And the Court’s reasoning may require lower courts to
oversee conduct that had previously been out of judicial view: consultation
between defendant and counsel about plea offers.
The defendant in Frye was charged with driving on a revoked license—a Class
D felony.124 The government sent a letter to defense counsel proposing either a
misdemeanor plea with a recommendation for a ninety-day term or a felony plea
with a ten-day term plus a period of probation.125 Defense counsel never informed
the defendant of the offer, and it expired.126 When the defendant was later rearrested for driving without a license, he pled guilty to the felony (with no
knowledge of the earlier plea offer) and received a sentence of three years in
prison.127 The Court held that “defense counsel has the duty to communicate
formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that
may be favorable to the accused.”128 There was a “reasonable probability” that
the defendant would have accepted the lesser plea because he ultimately entered
the plea to a more serious charge, with no promise of a sentencing
recommendation from the prosecutor.129
In the Lafler case,130 the defendant was made aware of a favorable plea offer
but got patently bad counsel about whether to accept it, complete with an
incorrect explanation of the burden of proof for intent to murder.131 The
defendant was offered fifty-one to eighty-five months of imprisonment in
exchange for his plea to assault with intent to murder. He proceeded to trial based
on his attorney’s forecast that he would prevail because the victim was shot below
the waist.132 Lafler was convicted and received a substantially harsher sentence
than the one offered in the plea: 185 to 360 months.133

bargaining than with regard to poor lawyering at trial, because a defendant will typically receive an
empirically higher sentence than was offered in the plea agreement. See Jenny Roberts, Proving
Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 732–38 (2011).
123. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
124. Id. at 1404.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1404–05.
128. Id. at 1408.
129. Id. at 1404–05. Although the Court found that Frye had established prejudice within the meaning
of Strickland, it remanded for a determination whether the state court would have accepted his plea to
the prosecutor’s offer given the intervening arrest. Id. at 1411.
130. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
131. Id. at 1383.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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The Lafler Court held that
[i]f a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of
counsel in considering whether to accept it. If that right is denied, prejudice can be
shown if loss of the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction on more
serious charges or the imposition of a more severe sentence.134

The correct outcome—that is the guilt or innocence of the defendant—is
immaterial to the Court’s reasoning. What matters here is whether a defendant
lost benefits that “he would have received in the ordinary course but for counsel’s
ineffective assistance.”135
Commentary on these cases has ranged from asserting that they are “no big
deal”136 to pronouncing them entirely “new ground” in the regulation of plea
agreements.137 In his dissent in Lafler, Justice Scalia objected that the Court has
opened “a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea
bargaining law.”138 The mixed reviews relate to a difficult and still pending
remedial question in both cases, which is how to restore the prosecution and
defense to the positions they would have occupied absent the constitutional
violation. Narrowing interpretations of the cases might also respond to Justice
Scalia’s suggestion that the application of hindsight standards will benefit
defendants who were not disposed to plead guilty. It will only be the rare case in
which a plea offer sits idle for a month, or a lawyer clearly neglects to explain the
strength of the prosecution’s proof.139 Yet almost every defendant convicted at
trial can claim that she meant to accept a plea offer. Courts are likely to treat
many frustrated defendants like they have long treated defendants complaining
of constitutionally ineffective assistance by trial counsel. And a deferential stance
with regard to bad decisions about plea bargains would have the same effect as
ex post justifications for poor trial strategy: few successful claims. Requiring
effective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage thus looks momentous
at first glance but may not break substantial new ground given its uncertain scope
and remedy.140
Accordingly, Padilla, Frye, and Lafler may change nothing about oversight of
prosecutorial tactics or the basic terms of pleas themselves. In fact, as with other
134. Id. at 1387 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 1388.
136. Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39 (2012).
137. Nancy J. King, Lafler v. Cooper and AEDPA, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 29 (2012); see also Adam
Liptak, Justices’ Ruling Expands Rights of Accused in Plea Bargains, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/us/supreme-court-says-defendants-have-right-to-good-lawyers.html
[https://perma.cc/9PDE-MVKD] (stating that the decisions “vastly expanded judges’ supervision of the
criminal justice system”).
138. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1413
(2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the “serious difficulties that will be created by constitutionalization
of the plea-bargaining process”).
139. See Jed S. Rakoff, Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25, 26
(2012) (calling the cases “rather easy”).
140. Both the question of remedy and the potential for waiver undercut the procedural impact of the
decisions. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains That Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance—Waiving
Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647 (2013).
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constitutional controls, they may “operate[] principally to facilitate frequent and
efficient plea bargaining.”141 The cases do not require counsel to fashion
dispositions that avoid collateral consequences,142 or to ensure the fairness of the
particular offers that defense lawyers are supposed to communicate. Nor do they
impose professional standards of adequate advocacy during the negotiations on
the legal or factual strength of the government’s case.
These three decisions thus might be oversold when it comes to their
significance to the future regulation of plea bargaining. They do not constrain
prosecutorial discretion to charge, narrow the range of potential sentences, or
demand the provision of more evidentiary information to defendants. They
could, however, modestly increase pricing accuracy by requiring defense counsel
to devote some resources to each individual case.143 And the most significant
implications of the decisions may arise from this intersection between the
efficiencies of the plea bargaining market and the massive (and failing) market
for representation of indigent defendants. Rather than regulate the effectiveness
of defense lawyers as negotiators, the Court has mandated certain conversations
between defendants and their counsel. Simply by insisting on the provision of
some information to clients, the decisions could have an impact on the overall
quality of publicly funded representation.
VI
THE POTENTIAL FOR MARKET EFFECTS
Incrementally improving indigent defense will hardly transform plea
bargaining itself. Both the high incidence of pleas and the terms of the bargains
arise primarily from systemic pressures rather than the shortcomings of defense
counsel.144 But specific requirements for the advice that counsel provides in the

141. Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 126,
126 (2012).
142. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (“The alternative courses and tactics in negotiation are so individual
that it may be neither prudent nor practicable to try to elaborate or define detailed standards for the
proper discharge of defense counsel’s participation in the process.”). But see Jenny Roberts, Effective
Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2662 (2013) (“[I]f creative bargaining to avoid
deportation—or to get a lower sentence, or a deferred prosecution—is the professional standard, then it
is necessarily part of the constitutional conversation about plea bargaining.”); id. at 2668 (“[I]t is difficult
to imagine effective representation that does not include affirmatively seeking the best plea bargain
possible given the circumstances of the case and defendant.”).
143. See Covey, supra note 14, at 964 (“The concept of effective assistance of counsel in plea
bargaining could easily be expanded to ensuring that the facts of individual cases are sufficiently
developed prior to plea negotiation to satisfy minimum standards of pricing accuracy.”).
144. Even those critics of the plea bargaining market who view it as “grossly flawed” do not blame
the quality of counsel for those flaws. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney,
and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 58 (1975); see also MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS
THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199–243 (1979) (explaining that
the high volume of misdemeanor pleas stems from factors, such as the bail process, that defense attorneys
cannot control); Stuntz, supra note 50, at 2558 (“[G]iven the array of weapons the law provides,
prosecutors are often in a position to dictate outcomes, and almost always have much more to say about
those outcomes than do defense attorneys.”).
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plea process could entail adjustments in the market for indigent defense. Ronald
Wright, who has written extensively about the structure of indigent defense
funding, stated in 2004 that “[t]he power of money, rather than constitutional
standards of quality, must drive any large-scale changes for indigent defense in
the future.”145 Wright correctly underscores the central issue of adequate
financing. And these recent developments in the case law could forge a new
causal link between constitutional standards and a floor below which defense
expenditures cannot go.
Constitutionally regulating the role of defense lawyers in plea bargaining
alters the cost-benefit calculus when it comes to funding priorities and thus
demonstrates a potentially beneficial market effect. Plea bargaining under freemarket rules is often described as corrupting “the purposes and principles of
criminal justice” and even compromising the professional roles and norms of
both prosecutors and judges.146 Market forces also have the power, however, to
focus attention on the funding crisis that public defender programs face. As long
as the imperative to prosecute and the systemic reliance on efficient resolution
by guilty pleas remain constant, even marginally higher baselines for adequate
counsel at plea bargaining could require more resource allocation to criminal
defense.
What a defendant most needs in order to assess a plea offer—that is, to meet
the minimal standard of what might be considered a rational actor—is accurate
counsel about the strength of the case and the range of potential outcomes.
Padilla, Lafler, and Frye could expand the standard of representation. They are
not just a general application of Strickland but a particularized finding that
certain shortfalls in the relationship between counsel and defendant always have
constitutional significance. Until Padilla, the Court operated on the assumption
that defense counsel would provide sufficient information about expected
outcomes, and it concluded that courts should not second-guess counsel’s
predictions or strategic advice.147 Now, even an error-free trial or a subsequent
voluntary plea that follows the ill-informed decision to reject an initial plea offer
cannot cure incompetent counsel.148
If real consequences flow from even this small category of inadequate
lawyering, the incentives to address the caseloads and resource constraints that
prevent effective advocacy could change.149 The same defense lawyers tasked
145. Wright, supra note 91, at 221–22.
146. BROWN, supra note 9, at 93; see also id. at 94 (concluding that market-based rules encourage
participants to “view plea negotiations as instrumental practices driven by partisan interests, rather than
as public law adjudication committed to public principles (such as punishment in proportion to guilt),
public criteria for fair process, and public responsibility for the integrity of criminal court judgments”).
147. See Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011) (“Plea bargains are the result of complex
negotiations suffused with uncertainty, and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in
balancing opportunities and risks.”).
148. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (rejecting the argument that “[a] fair trial
wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining”).
149. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Lawyering to the Lowest Common Denominator: Strickland’s
Potential for Incorporating Underfunded Norms Into Legal Doctrine, 199 FAULKNER L. REV. 199, 199
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with ultimately taking cases to trial are the ones who represent the vast majority
of defendants who instead enter pleas. There is no ex ante distinction drawn
within public defender programs between defendants who will and will not enter
into plea agreements. Nor can defense lawyers predict which clients will exercise
their right to trial. Because defendants who negotiate pleas and defendants who
contest their guilt coexist in a single system of both representation and
adjudication, movement with regard to one part of the system has spillover effects
on the factual and legal integrity of other cases as well. Responding to the
hydraulic pressure to bring counsel at plea bargaining up to a level that will
maintain the volume of cases resolved by pleas could affect the quality of defense
lawyering across the board.
One recent demonstration of the interwoven effects of state enforcement
goals and funding requirements arose in New Orleans. In April 2016, a judge
ruled that defendants in custody in New Orleans, awaiting trial but unable to
access defense counsel, should be released.150 In a decision addressing the cases
of seven defendants accused of violent felonies but unrepresented for more than
three months, the court held that the failure of the state to adequately fund
indigent defense violated the Louisiana Constitution, the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The order is
stayed pending appeal, but the state faces the prospect of the release of hundreds
of additional defendants without assigned defense counsel if it is upheld. A
mandate to proceed to trial in cases in which defendants received inadequate
assistance of counsel in plea bargaining could have similar systemic impact.
As Donald Dripps writes, “[l]egislatures disinclined to fund indigent defense
know that the failure to provide effective representation will lead to the reversal
of few if any convictions.”151 But when lawyers negotiating guilty pleas are held
to higher standards of representation, and greater resources are required to meet
those standards, it follows that funding should increase across the system of
public defense. That in turn could increase the availability of counsel to challenge
flawed evidence or assert constitutional rights in a way that impacts guilt and
innocence determinations at trial.
Indeed, increased resources have already been deployed to respond to the
mandate in Padilla. Many public defender organizations in large cities have
added in-house immigrant service plans that require additional staffing, and they
(2014) (arguing that the Strickland test does not reach issues related to underfunding and should be
strengthened by specific substantive guidelines).
150. Louisiana v. Bernard, No. 528–021 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016).
151. Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of Criminal
Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 903 (2013); see also Smith, supra note 108, at 544 (“[A] toothless
constitutional standard of effective representation . . . virtually invites legislatures to continue
underfunding indigent defense”); cf. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 20–21 (1997) (asserting that the Strickland standard
“leaves no room” for system-wide assessments, and that the case-by-case approach makes it difficult to
even separate “low-activity but good representation from laziness or incompetence”); id. at 20
(“Defendants tend to win ineffective assistance claims only when their lawyers had a conflict of interest
or made some discrete error of great magnitude.”).
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have increased operating budgets accordingly.152 Partnerships have also been
established with organizations such as the Immigrant Defense Project, which
receives some public funding and offers extensive “Padilla compliance” advice.
In July 2015, for example, New York State distributed over $8 million in grants
to legal services providers specifically to meet the standards outlined in Padilla.153
The Supreme Court similarly set a baseline when it translated the general
Strickland standard into some specific requirements for counsel in death penalty
cases in Wiggins v. Smith.154 There, the Court established that to be
constitutionally effective, counsel must comply with American Bar Association
guidelines mandating investigation into a defendant’s medical, educational,
employment, and family history, as well as cultural influences.155 One result was
an increase in public funding for “mitigation specialists” to prepare such reports
in death penalty cases.156
Put another way, when poor lawyering is no longer cost-free, the investment
in slightly better lawyering increases. The exogenous effect of the reinforced
constitutional standards can alter the state’s incentives. Advice about accepting
or rejecting pleas will now fall below Sixth Amendment minimum standards if
untimely, incorrect, or incomplete. Those potential Sixth Amendment violations
jeopardize the validity of pleas and the finality of convictions. Imposing a new
constitutional floor may lower a trial judge’s inclination to accept a suspect plea
bargain. Accordingly, only by observing concrete baselines for representation
can the state ensure preservation of the bargained-for exchange.
In a new equilibrium, efficient plea bargains will be those informed by at least
minimally adequate advice of counsel. Consumer protection in the form of
written explanations, increased communication with defense lawyers, and clearer
opportunities to consider offers could result. Public defender programs might be
compelled to observe some of the workload limits recommended in almost every
report on the failure of indigent defense.157 Compensation for court-appointed
counsel might also move away from the flat rate representation model and
toward hourly rates that better incentivize conveying sufficient information to
clients.

152. See PETER L. MARKOWITZ, IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT & N.Y. STATE DEFS. ASS’N,
PROTOCOL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER IMMIGRATION SERVICE PLAN APP. A
(2009) http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/COD%20Network/Jain%206%20
%20Protocol_PD_Immigration_Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F3L-5D7U] (listing public defender
organizations with in-house immigration experts or contracted experts).
153. See Joel Stashenko, State Distributes $8.1 Million for Immigrant Legal Centers, N.Y.L.J. (July 9,
2015), https://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=6efe1e67-8ba9-4f09-bd820dbd01f2f60c&pdsearchterms=
LNSDUID-ALM-NYLAWJ-1202731623737&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true&cbc=0.
154. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
155. Id. at 524 (citing GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 11.4.1(C) (A.B.A. 1989)).
156. See id. at 546 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that trial counsel now has an “inescapable duty” to
seek such reports).
157. See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 80.
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The Court’s recent decisions can be seen as imposing some quality controls.
The more time defense counsel has to investigate a case and communicate with a
client, the more complete the information a defendant will receive. Of course,
the ability to transmit information intersects with discovery rules and practices,
and in some jurisdictions defense counsel does not receive sufficient discovery
pre-plea to make accurate predictions or give sound advice.158 An infusion of
resources will be especially beneficial in those jurisdictions that provide rulesbased discovery of inculpatory and exculpatory evidence or that have
prosecutorial offices with a practice of turning over that information. There,
money spent on defense will serve as a proxy for the quality of the information a
defendant receives. In every jurisdiction, however, this modestly expanded
conception of adequate plea bargaining advice will require some expenditure of
time. And our legal economy is one in which hours and dollars are largely
interchangeable.
Budget shortfalls are an economic reality, but responding to them is also a
matter of priorities and political will. Overall, the United States spends .0002%
of per capita GDP on the system of public defense, but twice as much on funding
for prosecutors, and fourteen times as much on the cost of public corrections.159
As Justice Sotomayor observed in a recent case concerning a capital defendant’s
long wait for appointed counsel, “states are always strapped” but they find funds
in the criminal justice budgets to “pay the prosecutor.”160 The incentive to pay
defense counsel changes along with the slight but significant increase in the
information defendants must receive in the plea bargaining process.
VII
CONCLUSION
Padilla, Frye, and Lafler do more than identify isolated failures by defense
counsel—they impose new substantive preconditions for voluntary pleas.161 The
free-market characteristics of the plea bargaining system itself will almost
certainly remain the same.162 In fact, arguably the decisions now require the

158. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 33, at 385 (summarizing an empirical study that indicates that
North Carolina’s open-file pre-plea discovery generates more efficiencies than Virginia’s limited pre-plea
disclosures to defendants).
159. JUST. POL’Y INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC
DEFENSE 7 (2011). The level of funding contrasts rather starkly with the commitment made in similar
adversarial systems. The United Kingdom, for example, spends .2 percent of its per capita GDP on public
defense, which is four times more than it spends on the prosecution side. Id.
160. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Boyer v. Louisiana, 133 S. Ct. 1702 (2013) (no. 11-9953).
161. But see Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of
Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 562 (2014) (suggesting that the cases concern no more
than “single instances of bad lawyering” and do not reach larger systemic issues).
162. See Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133 (2013) (arguing that
even as the Court requires more notice to defendants it grows more willing to tolerate functional coercion
in plea bargaining). But see Covey, supra note 62, at 600 (citing the Court’s “increasing abandonment of
the concept of plea bargaining as an uninhibited free-for-all in which prosecutors have carte blanche to
offer criminal defendants whatever deals they think convenient to dispose of cases”).

GRIFFIN (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2017]

3/14/2017 2:26 PM

PLEA BARGAINING AND THE MARKET FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE

105

defense lawyer to engage in bargaining as a market participant. But courts cannot
uphold the negotiated “contracts” absent minimally adequate advice of counsel.
The changing constitutional landscape in turn addresses a political process
failure. Public interest groups that have attempted to litigate the problem of
chronic underfunding have had limited success in bringing about indigent defense
reform,163 and the political economy of funding criminal defense has constrained
legislative approaches as well.164 Nor has it been possible for guidelines set forth
by professional organizations to raise the standard of representation without a
parallel increase in available resources.165 But a baseline for constitutional
competence that makes minute-long meetings between defendants and lawyers
just minutes longer could change that. Applied to millions of cases in a system of
public defense that costs over $4 billion nationwide,166 it might induce some
systemic change.
The market rationale for plea bargaining presumes a competent defense
lawyer providing information on case value. The Supreme Court has now
suggested a minimum amount of information that clients must receive.
Transmitting that information will take time, and time requires more funding for
legal representation. Because of the sheer volume of cases in which the market
for plea bargaining and the market for publicly funded counsel intersect, even
this slight pressure on the regulatory lever could increase the incentive for state
investment in indigent defense.

163. See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 427, 462–63 (2009).
164. See LEWIS, supra note 70, at 211 (quoting Attorney General Robert Kennedy: “The poor man
charged with crime has no lobby.”); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the
Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089–90 (1993). But see Wright, supra note 91, at 254 (“[L]egislatures
sometimes vote for things that benefit the defense even when courts interpreting the Constitution do not
demand them.”).
165. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14–3.2(b) (A.B.A., 3d ed. 1999)
(“Defense counsel should not recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate
investigation and study of the case have been completed.”); cf. Wright, supra note 91, at 268 (concluding
that “[q]uality standards are possible to formulate, but it is virtually impossible to measure, for an entire
system, how close the defense attorneys come to fulfilling their obligations under the standards”).
166. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE GOVERNMENT INDIGENT
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, FY 2008-2012 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sgide0812.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E85H-ZKLQ]; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW., FEDERAL INDIGENT DEFENSE
2015: THE INDEPENDENCE IMPERATIVE 17 (2015), https://www.nacdl.org/indigentdefense/federalcrisis/
[https://perma.cc/48QG-6M7H].

